retirees. Our essay looks to the options available to these constituencies, as well as to the national government, to maximize satisfaction of state obligations in the event that states fail to meet them. We consider five potential "failure" scenarios:
1. Payment delays and IOUs: States may simply seek to delay repayment of their obligations without attempting to diminish their ultimate liability, or they may resort-as California and Illinois already have-to paying private businesses, local governments, and others with short-term IOUs rather than real money.
Alterations to Long-Term Obligations:
States in economic distress may decide to alter the terms of long-term agreements with current and former employees to provide pensions and healthcare benefits. 3. Bailout: The national government may seek to "bail out" a financially troubled state, much like the International Monetary Fund might bail out a sovereign debtor or a distressed debt lender might lend on an emergency basis to a cash-strapped business. If a bailout occurs, the interesting questions concern what concessions the national government might extract in order to minimize the prospect of recurrence, as well as what long-term effects a bailout might have on the financial independence of the states. 4. Default: "Default" may mean a number of things, including a delay in payment or payment in something other than cash (an IOU). For purposes of this essay, however, "default" means failure to pay principal or interest when due with no clear plan of when, if ever, it will be paid. 5. Bankruptcy: Though not currently an option for states, scholars and politicians have suggested a voluntary bankruptcy regime for states, and one of our fellow symposium contributors argues for a mandatory regime. Although many of the constitutional issues raised by these scenarios will overlap, each also raises unique questions of its own.
Part I of this essay describes and analyzes the fiscal challenges currently facing state governments. In the following Parts, we offer a constitutional perspective on each of the five sets of options available to address the states' fiscal challenges. In Part II, we consider payment delays, IOUs, and alterations to pension and healthcare obligations.
Part III addresses bailouts, and Part IV considers default. In Part V, we describe constitutional concerns raised by proposed state bankruptcy schemes. We cannot hope to offer definitive answers; many of the salient issues have never been considered by the Supreme Court, and others have not been revisited in over a century. We aspire only to flag these questions so that policy discussions may be informed by the relevant constitutional background principles.
I. THE STATES' FISCAL CHALLENGES
Financially speaking, the states are a mess. Professor Greve wrote last year that " [d] eficits for the current budget cycle are estimated at $175 billion. In some states (Texas, California, Nevada, and Illinois), the shortfall exceeds 30 percent of projected budgets." 17 The long-term picture is considerably worse: "Unfunded pension obligations are estimated at upwards of $1 trillion and are probably three or four times that amount. Unfunded health care commitments clock in at upwards of a half trillion. Bond debt issued by state and local governments comes in around $2.8 trillion." 18 Nor are these problems simply a short-term manifestation of the late economic unpleasantness. The United States Government Accountability Office notes that the "fiscal position of [the states] will steadily decline through 2060 absent any policy changes." 19 The policy changes required to maintain fiscal balance at the state level-cutting spending and raising taxes-are not politically palatable. And the necessary extent of those policy changes-action taken today and maintained every year equal to a 12.5% reduction in spending or increase in taxes 20 -makes them nearly politically impossible to implement.
In this fiscal landscape, prudent stakeholders should consider how a state may react if (or when) it cannot support its current obligations with revenues or borrowing-that is, if it could not pay its debts as they came due. 21 In the corporate arena, analysts distinguish between 18. Id. 19. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 1. 20. Id. at 2. 21. For a municipality-the only government entity with a bankruptcy option under current law-to be eligible for bankruptcy under Chapter 9, it must be unable to meet its obligations when they become due. 11 U.S.C.A. §109(c) (West 2012). two kinds of distress. Firms in financial distress are "viable as going concerns, but currently having difficulty repaying debts," or they "cannot meet [their] debts as they come due, but [have] a positive cash flow from current operations." 22 Firms in economic distress, on the other hand, have "low or negative operating profitability and have questionable going concern value even in the absence of leverage" or "negative cash flow." 23 Generally, firms in financial distress are proper candidates for restructuring under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. These firms are simply carrying too much debt, which can be written down in a reorganization. When a business is no longer sustainable as a going concern, however, it is in economic distress. These firms are the proper candidates for liquidation under Chapter 7 of the Code. To determine which kind of distress a corporation faces, the Code essentially treats the first day of bankruptcy as the creation of a new firm. The new firm does not carry the debt burdens of its predecessor and must cover all new expenses. 24 If it cannot cover new expenses even without the burden of its predecessor debt, it faces economic distress and is likely a better candidate for liquidation than reorganization.
What kind of distress are states in? Arguably, this question is irrelevant because we cannot liquidate states. 25 The available solutions are either to bail them out or to restructure their obligations by 22 905-06 (2012) . The Constitution does not guarantee the continued existence of any given state in so many words, but numerous provisions seem to foreclose "liquidating" a state of the Union-at least without that state's consent, and possibly not even with consent. First and foremost, Congress lacks any such enumerated power in Article I. Moreover, Article IV's statement that "no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1, would put a damper on incorporating the territory of a liquidated state within some other more solvent state. Similarly, Article V provides "that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate," U.S. CONST. art. V, which would certainly be one consequence of liquidation. Finally, the Guarantee Clause obligates " [t] he United States [to] guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government," U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4, a promise which arguably requires the U.S. to preserve a state's existence for the benefit of its citizenry, even if the current leadership of a state consents to liquidation.
imposing "haircuts" or extending maturities. But the financial distress versus economic distress distinction helps us understand what kind of restructuring or bailout would be required and if it would be effective. Payment delays, IOUs, bailouts, and defaults can each alleviate financial distress, although each option is more appropriate under certain circumstances and each presents certain side effects. By comparison, only default, alteration of long-term obligations, or a bailout so large that it essentially transfers the liabilities can fix economic distress. In that circumstance, payment delays, IOUs, or a limited bailout will only delay eventual default or federalization of liabilities.
States may experience financial distress for a number of reasons. State receipts-not only from taxes, but also from income on state assets or grants from the federal government 26 -may decline for economic reasons (the recession) or policy reasons (tax reductions, federal grant cutbacks). Likewise, expenditures-including wages and salaries of state employees, health insurance and pension costs, payments of social benefits such as Medicaid and unemployment, and interest payment on financial debt 27 -may increase for a variety of reasons. These include not only deliberate spending increases, but also increases in persons needing public assistance in a recession, natural disasters, population shifts, demographic shifts (e.g., pensioners living longer), and rising healthcare costs.
A state may also be in financial distress due to a mismatch of maturities 28 or failure of its political leaders to enact budgets in a timely fashion. Payment delays and IOUs can solve these kinds of problems. These modest forms of distress require only modest solutions. 29 If states are in more substantial financial distress, however, they will need to reduce their leverage-that is, their debt. States may reduce their leverage by reducing their obligations outright or by 26 . U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 7, at 6 n.10. 27. Id. 28. That is, they expect revenue to come in at a later date than the date on which their bills are due.
29. Revenue Anticipation Notes and Taxation Anticipation Notes (RANs and TANs) are frequently used cash-management tools that combat mismatched maturities and are not viewed as indicative of distress. However, when an entity cannot rollover its RANs and TANs, a classic liquidity crisis-the epitome of financial distress-follows. [VOL. 7:1 adding assets. 30 Reducing their obligations requires the states to break or alter promises-for example, by imposing "haircuts" on bondholders, reducing services to constituents, or failing to pay pensions and other benefits as promised to former employees. On the other side of the balance sheet, states have two ways to add assets. The first is austerity. States can cut spending, increase taxes, or both. The second is through some sort of bailout from the federal government, which may provide grants to subsidize particular state activities or funds to pay affected stakeholders like bondholders and pensioners.
Each of these options has important downsides from a policy perspective. A bailout will fix the immediate problem, but potentially create other problems. As we discuss in Part III, the risks are familiar from the bank bailout of 2008, but they actually have a history going back to the dawn of the Republic. 31 These risks include moral hazard-that is, if the federal government is going to pay, why should state politicians quit promising big pensions, healthcare, education, and other vote-winning services and entitlements? Likewise, if federal authorities are going to pay, then bondholders don't have to price the risk of the state not paying them; rather, they price the risk of the federal government not stepping in to cover the state's obligations. For nearly two centuries, the federal government has maintained a commitment not to bail out states. If current leaders are tempted to depart from that commitment, they should be mindful of the impact of any such departure on the structure of our federal system.
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If the states reduce leverage by breaking promises to various stakeholders, we should expect predictable consequences. If the states break promises to bondholders, tighter capital markets should result. State governments will confront higher interest rates, fewer willing lenders, and possibly different kinds of lenders. Likewise, if the states default on obligations to their employees, employees may decrease their willingness to provide their labor at below-market wages in exchange for promises of a pension and other post-employment benefits. States may have to pay higher wages in order to attract desired candidates to public-sector jobs. If states are in economic distress-that is, accruing liabilities at unsustainable rates-a bailout that adds assets on a one-time or limited basis will only be a band-aid. The obligations will continue to accrue at a rate that the state's assets cannot cover, and additional assets (more federal dollars) will have to continue to be added over time. A one-time infusion of assets, without corresponding reductions in future liabilities through debt restructuring, revenue increases or expenditure decreases, will only postpone the problem. 33 In other words, a bailout of an economically distressed state will only delay an eventual default or federalization of liabilities, whereas a bailout of a financially distressed state will plug a hole, hopefully enabling the state to become economically self-sufficient again.
State distress poses dilemmas for creditors beyond those ordinarily associated with insolvency in the private sector. States are not corporations; they (currently) cannot file for bankruptcy. Their creditors cannot employ common techniques used in corporate insolvencies to satisfy the creditors' debts, including equitizing their holdings or liquidating all of the state's assets. It is unclear what, if any, enforceable remedies a stakeholder has against a state. As one mutual fund advisor recently explained with regard to foreign sovereign debt:
When a sovereign issuer faces a solvency crisis, the willingness of the government to pay its creditors becomes the key issue. A corporation almost always wants to pay, in order for management to save itself. It will sell prize assets to do so. A country will not. . . . Ultimately, the buyer of sovereign debt is making the leap of faith that the borrower will repay, even when times are tough and even if it is not politically expedient to do so. The owner of corporate debt has to trust their borrower as well, but that trust can be enforced through the lender's legal claims on the borrower's assets. 33 . As an example, imagine a state that generates $100 in assets and $300 in liabilities every year. It has a $200 deficit. The federal government bails out the state that cannot pay its bills (and cannot access the bond markets) by giving it $400. In two years, if the state is not generating more assets (revenues), it will have used up the bailout money, but still have a deficit of $200 in the third year (and each year in the future). Even if revenues double to $200, the economically distressed state would have a $100 deficit. The eternally springing hope would be that the bailout would be followed by an economic rebound that would increase tax revenues and plug the hole between assets and liabilities. This is unrealistic given the size of the state budget shortfall. See supra notes 8-10.
[VOL. Illinois has resorted to payment delays more broadly, on account of a widening gap between expenses and revenues and the state's chronic unwillingness to confront its long-term structural budget deficit. 37 Most late payments are owed to school districts, public universities, and other governmental entities. The state pays a one percent "late fee" to nongovernmental payees who receive late payments. As of December 2010, Illinois estimated that approximately $1.5 billion in past-due bills were eligible to receive the one percent fine. In March 2011, Illinois established a Vendor Payment Program that allowed investors to buy vendors' claims at par and then collect the amount owed (including the one percent fee) from the state. 38 The purpose of this program is to transfer accounts receivable ownership to investors and away from service providers who may be harmed by late payments and forced to lay off employees or take other measures that may harm the general economic health of the state. 39 In 2010, Illinois paid roughly thirty million dollars in late payment charges.
When states like California and Illinois delay payments to employees and service providers, they may well find themselves in breach of their contractual obligations. And to the extent that state law cuts off any recourse for such breach, payment delays may raise constitutional questions. If state law effectively changes the payment terms of the state's contracts, for example, that might well amount to "impairment" under the Contract Clause. 40 Similarly, the retroactive imposition of such a change on obligations that the state has already undertaken might raise takings and due process concerns under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. 41 For most creditors whose payments have been delayed, however, litigation is unlikely to be a satisfactory solution. After all, litigation will generally take far longer to achieve any sort of result than the duration of the payment delay itself. Large creditors may find it 37 [VOL. 7:1 worthwhile to seek compensation for a fair rate of return on the money owed during the period of the delay. The Court has recognized a doctrine of "temporary takings," which holds that "where the government's activities have already worked a taking of all use of property, no subsequent action by the government can relieve it of the duty to provide compensation for the period during which the taking was effective." 42 Under this doctrine, a large creditor-or perhaps a group of small creditors, such as public employees, aggregated into a class action-might seek retrospective relief even after the delay had ended. Alternatively, where a state has institutionalized procedures for late payment-as in Illinois-creditors who can show a likelihood of future late payments might seek prospective relief enjoining the operation of those procedures. Crucially, public employee pension and healthcare plans tend to be "defined-benefit" plans, under which the employer pledges to provide a specific benefit at a future time, while private employers have generally moved to "defined-contribution" plans that promise only to contribute certain specified amounts toward those future expenses.
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Under a defined-benefit plan, "the burden is placed on the employer to contribute funds to the pension plan on an actuarially sound basis so that sufficient funds exist to pay the worker when he or she retires." 54 The problem, of course, is that many if not most states and localities have failed to meet that burden. As a result, "[s]everal states will surely require substantial new revenue soon, or they will need to institute benefit cuts if they are to return their plans to long-term solvency." 55 Not surprisingly, states are increasingly moving to reduce their obligations. Fourteen states have changed the rules of their plans by increasing the contributions required from the employee. 56 And at least three states-Colorado, Minnesota, and South Dakota-have sought to restrict cost-of-living adjustments (COLA) to benefits for current retirees. 57 Contract Clause litigation has ensued in each of these three states over the COLA reductions, as well as in New Hampshire over increases in employee contributions.
58
The Contract Clause was included in the Constitution primarily as a constraint on legislative impairment of private contracts-that is, to prevent states from intervening on behalf of private debtors against their creditors.
59 Beginning with Fletcher v. Peck, 60 however, the
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
A defined-benefit plan is "fully funded" if it has, "at any given date, sufficient money to pay all accrued vested benefits." Mitchell, supra note 11, at 59. As Professor Mitchell explains, though, this concept is "inherently a moving target: Future benefit projections rely on assumptions about wage increases, labor turnover, mortality patterns, inflation, and other factors, and asset returns are also not reliably forecasted." Id. at 60. Therefore, there are discrepancies in various estimates as to how underfunded the states' plans actually are. What is not in dispute, however, is that underfunding is a serious problem.
55. Mitchell, supra note 11, at 57. 56. Id. at 69. 57. Id. at 69 n.24; Secunda, supra note 53, at 276; see also Jennifer Staman, Congressional Research Service R41736, State and Local Pension Plans and Fiscal Distress: A Legal Overview 1 (2011) ("In 2010 alone, over 20 states introduced or passed legislation aimed to reduce or otherwise modify pension plan benefits for current or future retirees.").
58. See Secunda, supra note 53, at 276-83 (discussing the Minnesota, South Dakota, and Colorado litigation); Joey Cresta, Ruling issued in pension suit, SEACOASTONLINE.COM (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.seacostonline.com/articles/20120202-NEWS-202020377 (discussing the New Hampshire litigation). We cannot say with confidence that these are the only lawsuits, given the difficulty of identifying early-stage litigation in state courts. Beneficiaries may also challenge alterations to pension and other benefit plans under state constitutional provisions, many of which specifically protect pension benefits. See Cuccinelli, Getchell & Russell, supra note 51, at 534. Although it would be a huge mistake for lawyers and policymakers to neglect these state constitutional protections, they are regrettably outside the scope of this essay.
59. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 613 (2d ed. 1988) (stating that the "common view" of the legislative history underlying the Contract Clause suggests it was added to the Constitution to "protect private contracts from improvident majoritarian impairment" discussion in the New Hampshire case suggests, "in more recent years, the majority of state supreme courts have tended to protect pension rights" as contractual in nature. 69 On the federal side, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit has developed a potentially important impediment to such claims. Although acknowledging that the Contract Clause's protection extends to "contractual rights against the state created by legislation," that court has required that "the legislature's intent to create such rights against the state be unmistakably clear." 70 We have our doubts about this requirement, 71 but if adopted more broadly it could prove a substantial impediment to Contract Clause claims, at least where the pension benefits in question are created by statute rather than by ordinary contracts.
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In states that do create contractual rights to pension and healthcare benefits, Winstar, 518 U.S. 839, 879 (1996) (plurality opinion), "[t]he application of the doctrine . . . turns on whether enforcement of the contractual obligation alleged would block the exercise of a sovereign power of the Government." A suit for damages by a government employee when the government unilaterally alters the terms of an employment or pension contract hardly blocks the exercise of sovereign power-rather, it requires the government to internalize the costs of its change in the law. Certainly the Supreme Court has never applied the unmistakability doctrine in a case like Brand. See [VOL. 7:1 acting in violation of the U.S. Constitution. 87 This may permit certain challenges to IOUs: a creditor might sue, for instance, to enjoin the issuance of IOUs that arguably impair the obligation of the underlying debt instruments. Similarly, beneficiaries of state pension plans might be able to enjoin changes to the terms of the plan from going into effect. But creditors and beneficiaries will generally remain unable to force actual payment on the original debt or obligation. As one of us has argued elsewhere, the general structure of American state sovereign immunity law is designed to prevent courts from compelling payment on debts that threaten the financial viability of the states. 88 
III. BAILOUT
We can't/won't pay you unless the federal government gives us the money. If anyone is truly "too big to fail," surely it is a State of the Union. 89 Despite the seeming unpopularity of bailouts in recent years, it would be difficult for national authorities to explain why private banks and car companies warranted rescuing in 2008, but California or Illinois do not. Über-investor Warren Buffett, for example, has opined that "it would be very hard, in the end, for the federal government to turn away a state that is having extreme financial difficulties when in effect it honored [the debts of] General Motors and various other entities." 90 As with the banks and car companies, federal authorities may offer the states bailouts after concluding that the states are not simply too big to fail, but also too interconnected with other aspects of the economy to fail. Buffett and other market observers that "the political importance of California and the externalities associated with default are simply too great to imagine a world in which Congress and the president allow it to default," especially when "the federal government has already revealed its taste for bailouts in the private sector").
Bailouts involve asset transfers from the federal government to distressed entities. If the federal government chose to bail out a state, the bailout could take the form of unrestricted fiscal assistance, increased funding of existing programs, or new grant or loan programs. 91 A bailout is not the only form that federal assistance might take; as we discuss in Parts IV and V, Congress may legislate options to avoid or deal with a state default that the states probably could not enact on their own. We deal here with the simpler scenario where the national government funds or subsidizes the repayment of the states' debts.
If such a bailout does occur, it will hardly be the first time. As part of the famous "Compromise of 1790," southern members of Congress accepted Alexander Hamilton's proposal that the national government assume the Revolutionary War debts of the states in exchange for an agreement to locate the national capitol on the banks of the Potomac. 92 On the other hand, the national government has resisted outright bailouts of the states since the 1840s, when Congress allowed eight states to default despite considerable pressure from banks and foreign creditors. 93 Ten more states defaulted in the late nineteenth century after Reconstruction, again without federal intervention, and Congress allowed Arkansas to default during the Great Depression. 94 An important school of thought in political economy views this "no bailout" commitment as a pillar of our fiscal federalism. 95 Congress has nonetheless been willing to provide financial assistance to beleaguered states in less transparent ways. The federal government has given states direct aid in three of the six recessions since 1973. 96 Indeed, the federal government has already bailed out states in this recession by giving them at least $150 billion in direct requirements, modification of certain obligations (to, for example, public unions), and alteration of the state constitution.
Congress might exert control over a fiscally dysfunctional state by requiring spending cuts and revenue expansion. These spending and revenue requirements could be initial conditions or milestones; that is, Congress could impose them before advancing any funds or could condition future funds on meeting Congress's spending and revenue benchmarks. These future conditions, or milestones, are typical features of emergency financing because they give lenders control over a borrower. If a borrower fails to meet the lender-specified requirements, the lenders may withhold any remaining commitment amount or call a default. The IMF uses both initial conditions ("exante conditionality") and milestones ("ex-post conditionality") as a means to ensure borrower countries are able to repay the IMF.
101 IMF conditionality, also known as Structural Adjustment Programs, often include currency devaluation, industry privatization, trade liberalization, spending cuts on social services, required deficit reduction, and promotion of exports.
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It is fairly easy to imagine Congress tying its bailout money to spending cuts or revenue generation broadly. Perhaps such conditions would not strike most taxpayers as controversial. If taxpayers are going to lend one state their money, they may expect fiscal discipline to be the price paid for such benefit. A more difficult situation would be if Congress conditioned the bailout funds on specific spending cuts or manners of revenue generation. For example, Congress could require the state to raise taxes on cigarettes, start a lottery, cut spending on specified programs, or sell its state parks.
Congress may also impose structural reforms to serve as a more permanent fix to chronic fiscal imbalances than its spending and revenue milestones can achieve. The IMF's Structural Adjustment Programs, for example, have often looked to the performance and transparency of a state's political system in imposing conditions for IMF assistance. 103 It might, for example, require California to alter some of the dysfunctional aspects of its state constitution, such as the supermajority provisions that make it virtually impossible for California to raise certain kinds of taxes, or even its generous provisions for direct democracy. 104 These sorts of fundamental, politically oriented requirements would raise the most serious constitutional objections.
Both spending and revenue-generation milestones and more fundamental demands that a state alter its constitution can be analyzed as forms of conditional spending: the state does what Congress requires and Congress gives the state money. Such conditions are generally analyzed in two steps. First, we ask whether Congress would have the power to impose the condition directly. If so, we can stop there-the option of declining the money and avoiding the condition hardly makes the requirement more problematic.
105 But Congress often uses conditional spending to elicit results that it could not mandate directly; hence, the second question is whether the condition nonetheless represents a valid exercise of the spending power.
Many conditions that Congress might impose would likely be upheld at the first stage. The Supreme Court has held, however, that state sovereignty constrains Congress's ability to impose conditions on the states that go to basic decisions of constitutional structure.
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The Court has never explored the limits of that principle, so it is hard to know whether it would bar, say, a requirement that California change its constitution to facilitate future tax increases. Given the centrality of taxing and spending decisions to democratic governance, 107 however, federal requirements that states alter their constitutional frameworks for fiscal policy would present a serious test of Congress's authority.
The Court has also suggested-albeit a very long time ago-that the Constitution limits Congress's power to control state tax policy. 108 Although the Constitution imposed some limits on state collection of imports and exports, the states' "power of taxation . . . remains entire . . . [and] absolute."
109 Accordingly, the Court said, state legislatures retain discretion as to "[t]he extent to which it shall be exercised, the subjects upon which it shall be exercised, and the mode in which it shall be exercised."
110 "That discretion is restrained only by the will of the people expressed in the State constitutions or through elections, and by the condition that it must not be so used as to burden or embarrass the operations of the national government."
111 In particular, " [t] here is nothing in the Constitution which contemplates or authorizes any direct abridgment of this power by national legislation." 112 The Court made these statements in 1869, and federal law now interacts with state tax policy in myriad and complex ways. But it is still possible to imagine the Court balking at federal requirements purporting to direct state tax policy. required that spending conditions (1) be in pursuit of the "general welfare," (2) be clearly stated, (3) be "germane" to the purposes of the underlying spending, (4) not require the recipient state to take action that would itself be unconstitutional, and (5) not be coercive. 115 A condition requiring certain revenue or spending milestones, or a state constitutional amendment to remove impediments to revenue increases, would likely encounter difficulty only with the fifth prong: the Court has considered the "general welfare" requirement largely nonjusticiable; the condition could presumably be stated clearly; such a condition would plainly be related to the bailout's purpose of restoring the state to fiscal health; and it is hardly unconstitutional for a state to raise taxes or cut spending. But the dire financial straits giving rise to the need for a bailout and the likely scale of the federal financial assistance involved would present a far more powerful case for coercion than that in Dole. Nonetheless provided no guidance about how to know when federal strings cross the line from encouragement to coercion"). New York involved the anti-commandeering doctrine, which holds that Congress may not require the states to implement federal law, rather than an effort by Congress to use conditional spending to accomplish an object outside its enumerated powers. See also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that Congress may not require state executive officers to implement federal law). The anti-commandeering doctrine does not forbid voluntary state implementation, and so the question was whether the inducement for the states to implement the Low Level Radioactive Waste Act was so coercive that the statute should be treated as imposing a direct mandate. Under the Act, states choosing not to cooperate in implementing the federal regulatory scheme were obligated to "take title" to all the low level radioactive waste generated within their jurisdiction, and the Court (not surprisingly) held that this was coercive. See New York, 505 U.S. at 174-77. Like we said, it is an odd case.
As this essay goes to press, the Supreme Court is considering a coercion-based challenge to provisions of the federal Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA) that expand the states' obligations under Medicaid. See Greve, Argentina, supra note 6, at 32-34 (discussing these aspects of the PPACA). Although the Spending Clause arguments have generally taken a backseat to the Commerce Clause challenge to the PPACA's so-called "individual mandate," see generally Stephen E. Sachs, The Uneasy Case for the Affordable Care Act, 75 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 17 (2012) (focusing on the mandate), the Supreme Court devoted a whole hour of It is also not obvious that anyone would want to challenge the terms of a bailout under Dole. The recipient states, after all, will have consented. The persons most likely to complain about such a measure would be taxpayers in more solvent states, but the Court has generally not recognized federal taxpayer standing, 118 and in any event those taxpayers would be asserting the rights of third parties (the recipient states) in challenging the deal. 119 However, the Court has made clear that states accepting conditional federal benefits are not estopped from challenging the conditions imposed if they should later think better of their bargain. This is because the structural federalism principles that limit the spending power benefit not just the state governments themselves but also individual citizens; as a result, states lack the power to waive these protections. 120 A prudent federal official ought to assume that any bailout will have to withstand scrutiny under Dole.
A bailout might also require the states to alter some of their obligations to public-sector unions, pension holders, and the like. Here, the question is not the fifth prong of Dole (coercion) but rather the fourth-that is, whether the condition would require the state itself to violate the Constitution. And a condition requiring the state to renege might violate that requirement by raising Contract Clause problems that we have already discussed. 121 These problems might be avoided if the federal bailout legislation were to directly preempt the state agreements that Congress wishes to modify, because the Contract Clause by its terms applies only to the states. 122 To be sure, there is strong Supreme Court precedent suggesting that the United States is bound to honor its own contracts in much the same way that argument-that is, the full time that most cases get-to the Medicaid expansion. See Lyle Denniston, Argument preview: Health care, Part IV-The Medicaid Expansion, SCOTUSBLOG (Mar. 23, 2012, 12:02 AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/03/argument-preview-health-carepart-iv-the-medicaid-expansion/. It is possible that the Court's resolution of this challenge will clarify or even alter the existing framework for conditional spending analysis. Or not.
118 here is a clear distinction between the power of the Congress to control or interdict the contracts of private parties when they interfere with the exercise of its constitutional authority, and the power of the Congress to alter or repudiate the substance of its own engagements."
125 Federal legislation altering the terms of states' contracts would look a lot more like Blaisdell-that is, a government altering, for public policy reasons, the terms of agreements to which it is not a party.
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The more formidable challenge to federal abrogation of state contracts would come from the Takings and Due Process Clauses.
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The Supreme Court has made clear that retroactive legislation that affects valid property interests raises problems under both these clauses. In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 128 the Court struck down the Coal Act, which imposed retroactive liability for healthcare benefits to coal industry retirees on companies that had employed those retirees in the past. The Court divided over the appropriate theory in that case. Justice O'Connor, writing for a plurality of four Justices, concluded that the Coal Act worked an uncompensated taking of property because it imposed a "considerable financial burden" on Eastern, interfered with Eastern's "reasonable investment backed expectations," and unfairly singled out particular companies to bear the burdens imposed by the Act. 129 Justice Kennedy's concurrence in Apfel identified a distinct ground for challenging retroactive legislation under the Due Process Clause: "Although we have been hesitant to subject economic legislation to due process scrutiny as a general matter," he noted, "the Court has given careful scrutiny to due process challenges to legislation with retroactive effects."
131 Because the Coal Act imposed retroactive liability on Eastern, it violated due process. 132 Similarly, a court may reason that federal bailout legislation imposing retroactive burdens on certain parties-reducing their pension benefits, for example-also violates due process.
What is even more striking about Apfel, however, is that while the four dissenters would have upheld the Coal Act, they all joined Justice Breyer's opinion insisting that retroactive legislation should be subjected to careful judicial scrutiny under the Due Process Clause. That opinion was quick to disavow claims that all economic legislation should receive great deference from the courts: "Insofar as the plurality avoids reliance on the Due Process Clause for fear of resurrecting Lochner v. New York . . . and related doctrines of 'substantive due process,'" Breyer wrote, "that fear is misplaced. . . .
[A]n unfair retroactive assessment of liability upsets settled expectations, and it thereby undermines a basic objective of law itself."
133 Rather than applying the "rubber stamp" approach with which the Court has traditionally reviewed most economic legislation since the New Deal, 134 Federal legislation that seeks to alter the states' pension and healthcare obligations in order to alleviate the states' economic distress is thus likely to encounter significant constitutional hurdles. And state laws abrogating or significantly altering those obligations, perhaps enacted as a predicate to a bailout, would encounter the same objections under the Fourteenth Amendment. Without some means of reducing the structural causes of the states' distress, however, it is hard to see a bailout getting through Congress. No legislator wants to be seen as giving a blank check to fiscally improvident state legislators.
This linkage between federal assistance and federal control highlights the second and more systemic constitutional issue with bailouts: their potential impact on America's system of fiscal federalism. There are basically two ways to organize spending and borrowing authority in a federation: the central government can exercise hierarchical control over borrowing and spending by the subunits, or it can leave those subunits fiscally sovereign-that is, free to make their own borrowing and spending decisions. If the federation takes the first approach, then the central government will generally be responsible for the subunits' fiscal health and will guarantee their debts. This is the system that Alexander Hamilton advocated when he sought to use the post-Revolutionary War debt crisis as "an opportunity to centralize fiscal authority" in the new Republic, 135 and it is the situation in most federal systems around the world today.
136
In the absence of hierarchical controls, however, it is critical that the central government commit not to bail out the subunits. Otherwise, as Jonathan Rodden has demonstrated, the federation deference to economic legislation challenged on due process grounds).
135. Rodden, supra note 90, at 124. 136. See Peterson & Nadler, supra note 6, at 255 ("Except in Canada and Switzerland [and the U.S.], state debts in all federal systems in the industrialized countries of the world are implicitly or explicitly guaranteed by the federal government.").
faces "a basic moral hazard problem": "When the central and lowerlevel governments both have authority to tax and spend, individual lower-level governments can harbor the belief that unsustainable fiscal burdens will ultimately be borne by other members of the federation through bailouts."
137 If markets perceive a bailout as likely, they will continue lending to subnational governments at rates that reflect not the subunit's solvency, but rather that of the central government. The subunits will thus remain largely free of market discipline, which may further increase incentives for unsustainable policies and compound pressures for a central bailout. Only a credible commitment by the national government not to bail out the subunits can ensure the operation of market-based checks on state fiscal policy. 138 Ever since Congress allowed several states to default in the 1840s, its "no bailout" commitment has been perceived as highly credible. Professor Rodden's recent analysis of state bond yields, credit default swaps on state debt, and state credit ratings, for example, demonstrates that financial markets continue to assess the creditworthiness of states individually and have not "priced in" an assumption that the national government would bail states out in the event of a default. 139 Nor have state officials behaved as if they expect such a bailout; rather, "state governments are making serious efforts at reform" rather than "throwing up their hands, staying the course, and placing all of their bets on a federal bailout."
140
To be perfectly honest, we find all this continued confidence in the U.S. government's no-bailout guarantee a bit puzzling. One reason, as already noted, is that Administrations of both parties and Congress have already proven willing to bail out private entities, such as General Motors and various banks. But more fundamentally, the relationship between the national and state governments is profoundly different today than it was in the 1840s. Then, the state and national governments operated in largely separate spheres, and both did relatively little. Nowadays, we live in an era of activist government, and most federal programs incorporate an important implementation role for the states through various "cooperative 137. Rodden, supra note 90, at 124. 138. See id. at 131-33 (arguing that a firm no-bailout commitment increases the spending discipline of states).
139. Id. at 137-40. 140. Id. at 140.
[VOL. 7:1 federalism" arrangements. 141 Two aspects of these arrangements are critical for present purposes: first, the national government now depends on state governments to achieve its regulatory and social welfare goals; 142 and second, much state spending is now driven by federal matching-funds arrangements and other federal requirements.
143 These developments both increase the pressure on Congress to bail out state governments and give rise to a plausible argument that it is only fair for Congress to do so.
What to do about this situation is one of the most profound questions of our federalism, and we cannot purport to answer it here. Our point is simply that policymakers considering what to do about state debt should be aware of the way that this particular policy dilemma ties into the more fundamental structural issues. Congress's commitment not to bail out the states has played a critical role in maintaining the states' fiscal sovereignty, and that commitment appears to retain significant credibility with both state officials and financial markets. At the same time, surrounding changes in the federal-state relationship have undermined many of the assumptions on which the no-bailout commitment rests. Whether one views a federal bailout as the last nail in the coffin of our federalism or a necessary step to a sounder, more Hamiltonian arrangement, policymakers should heed Sergeant Esterhaus's famous advice from Hill Street Blues: "[L]et's be careful out there." 144 
IV. DEFAULT AND REPUDIATION
We won't pay you now, and we may never pay you. It is not hard to imagine a scenario in which the states cannot meet their financial obligations, cannot raise revenue, and no bailout is forthcoming. Since 1840, after all, the national government has generally been willing to let states fail. 145 The last state to default on general obligation bonds 142. See id. at 671 ("[B]y the federal government's own admission, it is almost always unwilling and/or unable to take back the power to implement cooperative federalism programs.").
143. See Greve, Argentina, supra note 6, at 29-32 (outlining how state spending responds to federal incentives).
144. 147 With a little help from the Supreme Court's willingness to reinterpret the Eleventh Amendment, they largely got away with it. 148 In light of this history, we must consider the possibility that states may choose to forgo principal and/or interest payments on their bonds, fail to pay pensioners, or even repudiate certain debts outright. Although the consequences of default may pose a greater deterrent today, it would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of default entirely.
Consider the following scenario: as a state's financial prospects darken and a default becomes more likely, current holders of state debt are likely to sell their stake to investors with higher risk appetites-that is, "vulture" funds that speculate in distressed assets. It would become politically unattractive to call for austerity and sacrifice on the part of retirees to pay hedge funds at par plus interest when those investors paid pennies on the dollar for the bonds. At some point, the political pendulum might well swing, and voters would call for repudiation.
To be sure, a repudiating state would suffer dire consequences in the capital markets. Its bond rating would plummet, and it might find itself unable to raise further capital for some period of time. 149 But if a state can determine it does not need access to capital markets for some period, it may determine it is politically better to default. For example, Dennis Kucinich presided as mayor over a "default" of Cleveland's bank debt by letting Cleveland go into bankruptcy instead of selling a public utility-a decision that was politically damaging at the time but now seems to be viewed more favorably in (1996) (analyzing the nineteenth-century defaults).
146. In that case, the bondholders were eventually paid in full, albeit with a little federal help. 148. See, e.g., id. at 58-89; see also Cuccinelli, Getchell & Russell, supra note 51, at 532-33. 149. See RODDEN, supra note 6, at 63 (recounting that, after the defaults of the 1840s, the defaulting state governments were unable to access capital markets for a time); English, supra note 145, at 268 ("Rather than direct sanctions, the cost of default appears to have been loss of access to new loans.").
[VOL. 7:1 hindsight. 150 Repudiation of a state's bonds is surely unconstitutional under the Contract Clause. The question is whether bondholders have any prospect of a remedy. As we have already discussed, 151 state sovereign immunity poses a formidable bar to recovery on debt contracts by private plaintiffs. Conventional wisdom holds that such recovery will be virtually impossible in the unfriendly forum of state court. 152 Although two Mississippi courts in the 1840s found that the state was legally and morally bound to the payment of repudiated bonds, 153 that result is certainly the exception and not the rule. Federal court offers a potentially friendlier forum, but the Eleventh Amendment bars state-law suits where federal jurisdiction rests on citizen-state diversity of citizenship, and the Amendment's "penumbra" bars federal question suits predicated on the Contract Clause.
154
Two possible avenues might permit federal-court suits in the event of state-bond defaults. The first is waiver. Notwithstanding the wording of the Eleventh Amendment as a constraint on federal subject-matter jurisdiction, which is ordinarily unwaivable, the Supreme Court has long held that states may waive their sovereign immunity from suit. 155 Some state bonds actually include a waiver of sovereign immunity in the bond contract itself. We have found such waivers, for example, in bonds issued by North Carolina, 156 Massachusetts, 157 and Minnesota. 158 Where such waivers are unavailable, it may be possible to fit a bond suit into a more general waiver of immunity in contract suits, analogous to the general federal waiver in the Tucker Act. 159 The problem with both specific and general waivers is that they will be construed as only applicable to suits in state court unless the waiver specifically says otherwise. 160 They may, in other words, get creditors a hearing, but it will not ordinarily be a hearing in federal court. 161 Congress may, however, seek to induce states to waive their immunity more broadly for bond suits in federal court, 162 perhaps by conditioning federal financial aid on such waivers. Like other spending conditions, an induced waiver of state sovereign immunity would be analyzed under Dole's five-part test. 163 In general, courts have been unwilling to strike down state immunity waivers under this test. 164 As a result, a Congress that was inclined to help state creditors 172 have suggested that Congress should extend the federal bankruptcy regime to offer relief to state governments. A rapidly developing literature assesses these proposals, 173 and we attempt no comprehensive discussion here. Rather, we seek only to flag the most salient issues.
We begin by considering the ways in which the constitutional framework affects the traditional rationales for bankruptcy. Sovereign immunity largely obviates the primary rationale for private-sector bankruptcy-the need to avoid collective-action problems as multiple creditors seek to collect from the debtor. 174 Although some commentators continue to emphasize the need to eliminate holdout problems in renegotiating the terms of state debts, 175 proponents have stressed "the reduction of debt overhang as the principal justification for a bankruptcy framework for states." 176 These proponents also acknowledge that the continuing institutional autonomy of the state (and its resulting continued accountability to its citizens) must be a principal value in a state bankruptcy process; in valuing the continuing autonomy of the debtor, state bankruptcy is thus more like individual bankruptcy than its more familiar corporate form. 177 [VOL. 7:1 A federal bankruptcy scheme appears to offer two primary advantages in reducing a state's debt overhang. First, like the bailout conditions that we considered in Part III, it provides a federal rule to trump impediments to the adjustment of state debts. 178 Under the Supremacy Clause, federal law would preempt state constitutional provisions guaranteeing various state obligations, and federal requirements would likewise probably avoid the Contract Clause's constraints on state impairments of state governmental obligations.
179
Unlike a conditional bailout, however, a federal bankruptcy mechanism would presumably not be accompanied by an infusion of federal resources to help pay the creditors; indeed, state bankruptcy proponents frequently present it as a way to forestall the temptation for Congress to bail out the states. 180 Moreover, rather than incorporating adjustments to state obligations in a set of federal statutory conditions accompanying a bailout, a bankruptcy law would create an ongoing process of negotiation and accommodation overseen by a federal court.
The second advantage stems from the suggestion that a bankruptcy procedure might reduce "dysfunctional decision making" that leads to and exacerbates state financial crises.
181 By providing an alternative to federal bailouts, a bankruptcy law would require states to borrow at a rate that reflects the actual risk of default-without any implicit promise of a federal rescue. This, proponents argue, would decrease "lawmakers' temptation to fund current spending with borrowed funds."
182 Proponents also hope that "bankruptcy would counteract the political agency costs that have exacerbated order to free up the debtor's future prospects."); see also Gelpern, supra note 25, at 909 ("The missing link between contracts, capital structure, and governance makes states more like individuals, whose autonomy is a paramount value.").
178. 181. See, e.g., Skeel, supra note 49, at 9; see also Levitin, supra note 107, at 224 ("Bankruptcy could function as a political tool in several ways. It could serve as a political discipline mechanism; provide cover for politically unpopular decisions; serve as a convening mechanism to facilitate negotiations; and facilitate negotiations by setting baseline rules and alternatives.").
182. See Skeel, supra note 49, at 11.
states' pension problems." 183 By moving ultimate adjustment of pension obligations out of the state political process, where beneficiaries of these obligations may exert undue political influence, state bankruptcy might give beneficiaries an incentive to insist that pensions be adequately funded in the first place. 184 Even if these predictions prove accurate, however, it is not clear that bankruptcy would address the root dysfunctions that lead to state financial crises.
185
Most state bankruptcy proposals have been limited to voluntary participation by state governments, presumably in order to avoid constitutional difficulties. In his contribution to this symposium, however, Adam Feibelman boldly goes where no other scholar has gone before-he proposes a mandatory bankruptcy regime for state governments. 186 The primary virtue of a mandatory regime over a voluntary one, he argues, is that it would prevent states from waiting too long to file. " [T] he benefits of allowing states to file for bankruptcy," Professor Feibelman argues, "could be slight compared to the costs that states will incur and externalize as a result of their delay in voluntarily seeking relief." 187 Feibelman's proposal is "extreme" in a helpful sense because it brings to the fore some constitutional considerations that might otherwise have remained submerged. For that reason, his proposal is a valuable contribution to the ongoing conversation about state debt.
That doesn't make it constitutional, however. We might begin by asking, what is the enumerated power that authorizes Congress to subject states to bankruptcy proceedings? We doubt it is the bankruptcy power, because sovereign debt has long been understood to raise unique problems outside the purview of bankruptcy; certainly the Founders' discussions of state debts in the Federalist papers and 183. See id. at 12. 184. Id. But see Levitin, supra note 107, at 225 (warning that "[i]t is impossible to say . . . whether [taking debt negotiations out of the political process] enables politicians to look out for the commonwealth rather than to be beholden to narrow rent-seeking interests or merely gives politicians the ability to reach deals of personal convenience without regard to their constituents' interests").
185. See Levitin, supra note 107, at 219-20 (arguing that the states' budget problems are structural in nature, arising from a mismatch between the states' countercyclical spending obligations and state constitutional restrictions on borrowing and budget deficits).
186 189 Congress would most likely have to fall back upon its power to regulate commerce-after all, states sell bonds, purchase services, and engage in other commercial activities in a national market. The question then would be whether the commerce power can be understood to include the power to regulate the states' own finances. 190 Our objection at this point begins to sound not so much like a denial of national enumerated power, but rather like an assertion of an immunity from national regulation grounded in some aspect of state sovereignty. This is an underdeveloped area of constitutional law. The Court has suggested at times that the "states as states" retain certain residual rights of sovereignty that the national government may not invade even when acting pursuant to an enumerated power. In Coyle v. Smith, 191 for example, the Court held that Congress may not tell a state where to put its capitol. Under current jurisprudence, the anti-commandeering doctrine may be described as protecting a state's sovereign right to choose what laws it will make and implement. 192 195 Two years later, Bekins upheld an amended version of the same law, but again stressed the constitutionally sensitive nature of the subject:
The statute is carefully drawn so as not to impinge upon the sovereignty of the State. The State retains control of its fiscal affairs. The bankruptcy power is exercised in relation to a matter normally within its province, and only in a case where the action of the taxing agency in carrying out a plan of composition approved by the bankruptcy court is authorized by state law.
196
Professor Feibelman points out that all of these statements are arguably dicta, 197 and their vintage-the two cases were decided a year on either side of the Court's famous 1937 "switch in time"-makes it hard to say how they would fit into contemporary federalism jurisprudence. But requiring states to submit to the jurisdiction of a federal bankruptcy court and conform to a reorganization plan adopted by creditors and approved by the court seems to pose a significant intrusion on state sovereignty. 198 The problem would be still more stark if such a plan required the state to take measures like raising taxes. In particular, the intervention of the bankruptcy court would sever or at least undermine the link between state policy and 199 In assessing these cases, it matters that the Supreme Court has long since abandoned any general prohibition on federal regulation of state governmental functions. The Court had adopted such a prohibition-although a tentative and messy one-in National League of Cities v. Usery, 200 but it jettisoned that doctrine a decade later in Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority. 201 Garcia's reasoning is nonetheless instructive for Professor Feibelman's proposal. The Garcia majority rejected National League of Cities' implicit constitutional protection for state sovereignty on the ground that the constitutional structure protects states through their representation in Congress. 202 Hence, when Congress acts, it is with the consent of the states' representatives. 203 Garcia thus ushered in an era of "process federalism," under which judicial review eschews substantive line-drawing in favor of reinforcing the "political safeguards" of federalism. 204 A mandatory state bankruptcy scheme is problematic from this standpoint, because rather than having Congress regulate the states directly-as the federal law upheld in Garcia did, and as a conditional bailout might-it would delegate authority to restructure state finances to a federal court. While the states are represented in Congress, they have no analogous representation within the federal judiciary. Indeed, the Eleventh Amendment and two centuries of state sovereign immunity doctrine rest in large part on the view that federal courts are unfriendly to state governments, especially when they are sued on their debts. Although Garcia allows Congress to regulate the states' governmental operations, it is not nearly so clear that Congress may turn over control of state financial decisions to federal judges. 218. See id. at 181-82 (holding that because "federalism secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power," it followed that state officials "cannot consent to the enlargement of the powers of Congress beyond those enumerated in the Constitution").
219. 131 S. Ct. 2355 (2011). 220. Id. at 2364.
institutional details of how it operates. 221 From a pragmatic standpoint, as Professor McConnell points out, "the sovereign interests of the public might . . . be better served by breaking the stranglehold of old contracts, even at the cost of submission to the scrutiny of federal bankruptcy judges."
222 That it might be constitutional for a state to submit to bankruptcy jurisdiction, however, would not necessarily mean that, by so consenting, the state could delegate its taxing and spending authority to the bankruptcy court. 223 Taxing and spending do not necessarily lie outside the constitutional limits of judicial power per se. 224 Nonetheless, federal municipal bankruptcy law has traditionally denied those sensitive powers to the bankruptcy court, 225 and including them in an already-intrusive state bankruptcy regime might push any such scheme over the constitutional line. 226 Moreover, even if the overall scheme is valid, some orders that a bankruptcy court could issue-such as a "haircut" for state creditors-might implicate the Contract Clause and/or Takings Clause issues that we have discussed earlier. 227 221. Moreover, in analyzing the validity and scope of state consent, one would need to look not only to the federal but to the state constitution, because a state can hardly consent to something that its own constitution forbids.
222. McConnell, supra note 178, at 235. 223. See Gelpern, supra note 25, at 910-11 ("Neither bankruptcy judges nor contractual creditors have the democratic legitimacy to compel revenue measures."); McConnell, supra note 178, at 236 (suggesting that any valid state bankruptcy scheme "must ensure . . . that the democratic process and not the judiciary retains control over the states' fundamental taxing and spending decisions").
224. See, e.g., Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990) ("[A] court order directing a local government body to levy its own taxes is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal court."). Jenkins cited "a long and venerable line of cases in which this Court held that federal courts could issue the writ of mandamus to compel local governmental bodies to levy taxes adequate to satisfy their debt obligations." Id. 225. See Levitin, supra note 107, at 226 ("Traditionally, bankruptcy courts have not had the power to order tax increases or even rate increases for public utilities.").
226. A preferable approach might be to empower the bankruptcy court to enjoin the operation of state laws that prevent necessary taxing or spending, while leaving the actual execution of the tax or spending to state authorities. Cf. Jenkins, 495 U.S. at 51-52 (holding that the district court should have pursued this course in a desegregation case rather than imposing a tax increase by its own order). Such an injunction would remain an extraordinary exercise of federal power, particularly if the enjoined state tax or spending limits are not themselves unconstitutional.
227. See supra notes 121-133 and accompanying text.
Our final point is that, while many of the constitutional impediments to state bankruptcy that we have discussed are quite formal in nature, they may well make good functional sense. As Anna Gelpern observes, " [b] ankruptcy is at best unproven, and at worst unsuited to overtly political tasks, such as mediating among political interest groups and brokering fiscal federalism."
228 Sovereignty-based protections for state governments are, at bottom, meant to guarantee that the political organs of state governments decide important questions affecting the lives of their constituents-and that those constituents can hold state government democratically accountable for those decisions. 229 As dysfunctional as state governments may sometimes seem, it is far from clear that unelected generalists on the federal bench can make superior financial decisions, much less that those decisions will be perceived as legitimate by affected state citizens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Students of federal jurisdiction who care about state governance and finances are at risk of living out the famous Chinese curse: 230 "May you live in interesting times." In this essay, we have sought to identify some of the key constitutional issues that will complicate any effort to deal with the burgeoning crisis of state debt. As in much of the law of federal jurisdiction, the law rarely cuts off all remedies or precludes all meaningful reform, but it repays attention to history and doctrinal detail. Many of these issues are far too complex to permit any sort of definitive treatment here, and on some agreement remains elusive even among specialists. We hope simply to have sketched out a map for lawyers and policymakers who must pick their way through this maze.
228. Gelpern, supra note 25, at 895; see also Levitin, supra note 107, at 224 (concluding that " [b] ankruptcy cannot fix the underlying cyclical structural problem in states' budgets").
229. 
